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VOLUME XXXV APRIL, 1929 NUMBER 4
THE REGULATION OF LIEGAL PROCEDURE
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND*
Mtuch has been said and written about the imperfections
of legal procedure. It is a subject of great interest and con-
cern to the bar and to the public. Since rules of practice
prescribe the conditions under which rules of law may be
made operative, in so far as they fail of their purpose the
law itself becomes ineffective. Lord Campbell is reported to
have said that "The due distribution of justice depends more
upon the rules by which suits are conducted than on the
perfection of the code by which rights are defined."'
The legal profession, being charged with the duty of ad-
ministering the law, has always laid emphasis upon the
study of procedural theory, but its main interest has been
directed to a study of the procedural product, rather than
to a study of the process of production. This is entirely
natural, since lawyers are always engaged in using the
rules and can hardly escape observing how well or how ill
they function. If a rule works badly they want it changed;
otherwise they are content. Causes for failure are usually
* Professor of Law and Legal Research, University of Michigan.
27 LAw Joum. 104.
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looked for only in the rule itself, not in the source from
which it came or in the method by which it was prepared.
But it is obvious that such a basis for criticism is in-
adequate, and leads to negative results, and it would seem
worth while to consider the various means and methods for
encouraging and directing the reform of procedure, in order
to ascertain if possible what conditions are most favorable
for its successful development. Reforms are not brought
about spontaneously. Some agency must propose, formu-
late and validate them. Back of the reform itself is the
means and mechanism by which it must be brought about.
The machinery of reform is a subject which has received too
little attention.
I
Under the traditional method of the common law, the
courts formulated rules of practice and applied them as they
were needed in the course of litigation. As cases arose the
remedial problems which they presented were worked out
during thir passage through the courts.
There were great advantages in this method of procedural
development. It was eminently practical. The rules were
the product of actual experience, and were slowly evolved as
definite solutions of concrete problems by the leaders of the
English bar. The men who made the rules were the men
who used them. Every feature was the result of careful con-
sideration and grew out of the actual needs of contemporary
litigation.
It was, moreover, a method which produced a highly re-
fined technique. There is an adequacy, an appropriateness
and a technical perfection about common law procedure
which shows the skillful work of well trained specialists.
The system which it developed, preeminently judicial in its
origin, embodied the best thought of the ablest lawyers of
the age.
But there is a fatal weakness in any system of procedure
which develops as an incident of litigation. This results
from the rule of stare decisis. Within its proper field it
performs an invaluable service in the administration of
justice. Pollock has pointed out the inherent necessity of
2
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this rule in developing the principles of the law itself.
Without it case-law would have no rational basis. "We have
seen," he says, "that case-law has a scientific aim, namely,
the prediction of events by means of past experience, and
that the possibility of such prediction rests, an in other
sciences, on a fundamental assumption of uniformity."2  To
obtain a workable legal system there must be an assurance
that the same decision will always be given on the same
facts. "In English case-law this object is attained by what
seem the most obvious and direct means, namely, an under-
standing that the court will follow the authority of decisions
formerly given on similar facts."" Only by this means can
people feel any real confidence in the. stability of their legal
relations.
But the situation is entirely different in the field of pro-
cedure. While a general adherence to customary methods is
doubtless convenient, departures may be freely made as
often as it appears that change will improve the practice,
because the court is able by the exercise of its discretionary
power to fully protect the litigant from prejudice in each
case of variation from precedent. For instance, any rule of
pleading might be changed at any time without substantial
injury to the pleader, if the court should allow an appro-
priate amendment to conform the pleading to the new rule
on a showing of justifiable ignorance of the change. Since
personal and property rights are not directly involved, the
rules of procedure are matters of indifference to suitors
except in so far as they enable them to secure decisions on
the merits of their cases, no possible harm could result from
such a course. The entire problem would be one of notice to
the profession of the changes introduced, and want of notice
can always be supplied later with no harm beyond tem-
porary inconvenience.
The common law judges did not, however, distinguish be-
tween rules of law and rules of procedure. Convinced of the
necessity of following precedent in one field they pursued
the same course in the other, and the result was the utter
stagnation of procedure. Rules became perpetually binding
2 "The Science of Cae-Law", in EssAYs n JuISptDENcE AND ETmHCS,
p. 240.
0 Id., p. 240.
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merely because they were once announced, and the elasticity
vanished from common law practice. This is a result to be
expected in any jurisdiction where procedural rules are
founded in case-law, and modern practice exhibits no strik-
ing superiority in this regard over that of the ancient com-
mon law. The tyranny of precedent makes it impossible for
procedural reform to flourish in the conventional atmosphere
of the court room. Some other means must be found.
II
The most obvious alternative to court processes for the
production of rules of legal procedure, is recourse to the
legislature. It is a direct and powerful method, a public
system of self-help, where the people demand by force what
the law in its orderly development has failed to furnish. It
is extrinsic, detached and arbitrary, suggestive of revolution,
rather than a gradual expansion of implicit possibilities
through inherent evolutionary vitality. So careful a scholar
as Pollock has declared that relief by direct legislation "is
not a natural operation at all, but a catastrophic inter-
ference."4 And in another connection he refers to a specific
amendment of procedural rules by legislation as "a service-
able instrument when rightly handled, but in unskillful
hands it can be a remedy worse than the disease."'
The advantages of the legislative method are patent, for
it avoids the great drawback to which procedural develop-
ment through litigation is subject. The legislature is not
bound in the slightest degree by any rule resembling stare
decisis. There is no presumption against change in legisla-
tive halls; indeed, quite the contrary, for the recognized need
of change is the sole occasion for the meeting of legislative
bodies. There is accordingly no inevitable restriction upon
ingenuity in reform to be found in this kind of procedural
development. Legal conservatism finds its way into legisla-
tive assemblies through lawyer members, but these are in
the distinct, often in the very small, minority, and their
presence furnishes no more than needed caution in a body
clothed with the enormous power of legislation.
4 "The Science of Case-Law" in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS,
p. 242.
5 THE GENIUS OF THE CommoN LAW, p. 72.
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But while the chief disadvantage found in the common law
system is absent from the legislative method, its great merit
is also lacking. Rules of practice laid down in legislative
acts do not grow spontaneously out of the exact require-
ments of actual practice, and they fail to show that delicate
adaptability to circumstances which distinguishes judicial
decisions. They are, in other words, less practical. They
embody legislative theory, not judicial experience, and often
destroy by their clumsy abstractness the very purposes
which they were created to serve.
Legislation also shows a want of technical refinement.
The subtle appreciation of the conditions of litigation, which
can only come to those who spend their lives in the active
administration of justice, is not usually found among the
political representatives of the people who meet to make the
laws. Notwithstanding that bills dealing with legal pro-
cedure may be drawn by lawyer members, the political
atmosphere of a legislative assembly is not friendly to the
close and painstaking study of an intricate mechanism
which is necessary for successful regulation. Crude drafts-
manship is characteristic of most of our legislation, but pro-
cedural laws suffer from the additional defect of crude ad-
justment and lack of coordination, thereby tending to dis-
organize the entire machinery of justice.
There are other tendencies in legislation which also pro-
duce undesirable results. Legislatures are timid about
making important procedural changes because they lack
both the technical information and the opportunity for
thorough investigation. They are therefore inclined to busy
themselves with perpetual changes in minor details instead
of undertaking broad programs of constructive legislation.
And the changes so made are as likely as not to be merely
meddlesome, and to serve no useful purpose whatever. Such
bills can readily pass unnoticed, when bills of real im-
portance would provoke extended debate and successful op-
position. This was the history of the New York Code of
Civil Procedure, that "monstrum horrendum," as Mr.
Coudert has called it,' which became so bulky and com-
plicated as to be almost unworkable. It was a conspicuous
8 CXTAnny AlD JUSTICE, p. 19.
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instance of legislative tinkering with details, "Even a tinker
of genius cannot get beyond tinkering, and tinkers are not
men of genius as a rule."7  Furthermore, legislative pro-
grams are usually crowded, and bills with a strong popular
appeal are given the right of way, so that any bill dealing
with a subject as dry as legal procedure will receive a cold
welcome at the capitol. Unless some organized effort can be
enlisted in its favor, such as a strong bar association ,can
occasionally command, there is little hope of its emergence
from committee pigeon holes. Even legislative commissions
for revising statutes usually feel that they must avoid intro-
ducing any change sufficiently marked to arouse opposition
on the floor of the assembly, lest the whole enterprise fail.
Such a striking legislative achievement as the New York
Code of Civil Procedure of 1848 occurs but rarely in the
history of legal institutions, and unusual combinations of
favoring factors are necessary for its accomplishment. The
New York Code rapidly swept over the newly organizing
West, and is the basis for the practice in the great majority
of the states beyond the Alleghenys. But the reform wave
quickly lost its vigor; Procedure requires constant atten-
tion, and no method of regulation will suffice which cannot
function steadily. As a start in the right direction the
American Code practice was excellent, but as a final goal,
and such it appears to have become, it is a monument to the
futility of legislative control of legal procedure.
It is further to be observed that no elasticity exists in re-
gard to a legislative mandate. No matter how crude, cum-
bersome, ineffective or unjust a statutory rule may be, the
court is powerless to alter it. This is aften lamented by the
courts, who are forced against their wills to execute the
harsh commands which legislatures have thoughtlessly
passed and quickly forgotten. "If," said the United States
Supreme Court in dealing with the service of process upon
a city, "the common law (which is common sense in matters
of justice) were permitted to prevail, there would be no
difficulty " * *. But when a statute intervenes, and dis-
places the common law, we are brought to a question of
7 PouoCK, THE GENIUS OF THE CommoN LAW, p, 72.
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words and are bound to take the words of the statute as
lawN .
8
And there is a third difficulty with the legislative regula-
tion of legal procedure, which is perhaps the most serious
of all. By its means we have divided the responsibility for
the administration of justice between the legislature and the
courts, and have thereby destroyed the possibility of locat-
ing the source of trouble. Division of authority always
tends to obscure responsibility, and where the officers or
agencies which share governmental power are so related that
the efficiency of one is dependent upon that of another, the
public becomes confused in its attempt to diagnose the situa-
tion and provide a remedy.
Under the legislative system, the legislature makes the
rules which the courts administer. Is the fault in the rules
themselves or in the way in which they are employed? No
one knows. The courts and the profession believe they are
doing fairly well with the rules that they are forced to use,
and point to the legislature as the authorized source of pro-
cedural reform. The legislature does not know what is
wrong with the rules and believes that the chief difficulty is
the inefficiency and technicality of the profession. Faced
with the dilemma of shifting and unascertainable responsi-
bility, the public is helpless, and the administration of
justice continues to be the one conspicuous failure in Ameri-
can popular government.
III
When we turn to the final alternative of a court-rule
system of procedure, all the drawbacks of the other systems
seem to disappear, and all the advantages seem to be pre-
served.
The principle of stare decisis, which made it impossible
for a vigorous and progressive system of procedure to de-
velop out of the processes of litigation, has no operative
status. The timidity of the legislature and its want of tech-
nical knowledge, no longer stifle progress, while the general-
ized form of the rules enables the profession to forecast the
proper steps to take with as much confidence as though the
8 Amy v. City of Watertown, 130 U. S. 301 (1888).
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practice were laid down in a legislative code. And finally,
the responsibility for the effectiveness and success of the
system is not only conspicuously localized in accordance with
well demonstrated principles of governmental policy but is
at the same time placed in the hands of those best qualified
to carry it.
No modern observer would be inclined to dispute Presi-
dent Lowell's assertion that the ability of popular govern-
ment to endure will depend upon its capacity to use experts.'
The administration of justice has always been a difficult and
delicate function of the state, and as civilization develops
the complexity of the problem increases. No one can possibly
understand or appreciate the nature of the technique essen-
tial to the work of the courts who is not familiar with the
conditions under which litigation proceeds. And if judicial
procedure is to be kept in close adjustment with the con-
stantly changing requirements of society, the regulation and
development of that procedure must be under the supervision
of those who carry on the work of the courts.
If David Dudley Field had been a more thorough student
of the history of the common law, he would not have been so
readily fascinated by the novel principle of legislative con-
trol of judicial procedure. It was a principle which seemed
to offer unlimited possibilities of relief from burdens long
endured. But those who hoped to bring the milleniun
through the magic of legislation, failed to appreciate the
delicate adjustment of machinery necessary to an efficient
administration of justice.
Never, in the eight hundred years since the Plantagenets
laid the foundations of our system of judicial administra-
tion, did Parliament ever undertake to chain the courts to
the chariot wheel of a legislative code of procedure. A few
corrective statutes found their way into the law. Magna
Charta prohibited the courts from selling justice, gave the
common pleas a fixed location, and established the principle
of trial by jury. A dozen statutes relating to amendments
are found among the. records of four centuries of parlia-
mentary activity.1 Here and there new remedial rights were
9 Pvu ac OP ioN Am Popru GovERNmzNT.
1o Collected in Appendix to STEnPnx oN PznADI o (Axvwizws' ED.), pp.
473-4.
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created and old procedural abuses were cut off. But there is
no instance, in all English history, of parliament undertak-
ing to assume to itself the political responsibility for the
administration of justice, nor to offer its crude, fragmentary
and stereotyped notations of procedure as a substitute for
the expert opinions of lawyers. Not even during the storm
and stress of the nineteenth century, when the flood of
popular resentment threatened to engulf the profession, did
Parliament lose its poise. The first great reform wave
brought the Civil Procedure Act, of 1833,"1 in which a con-
siderable number of procedural anomalies and restrictions
were removed, but at the same time the preamble of the act
recited that, since improvement in the methods of administer-
ing justice could not be conveniently accomplished otherwise
than by the Rules and Orders of the judges, therefore the
judges should make such alterations in the rules of plead-
ing and practice as they should deem expedient. Out of
this legislation grew the famous rules of Hilary Term, 1834.
They did not satisfy the public. But instead of violently
seizing the power of regulating legal procedure, Parlia-
ment again undertook to assist rather than oust the courts.
The Common Law Procedure Act of 185212 was a fairly com-
plete procedural code, in 239 sections, but it contained the
remarkable provision that the judges were nevertheless to
retain complete power to make any rules regarding plead-
ing and practice that they might deem expedient, anything
in the present act to the contrary notwithstanding.
For 800 years the Anglo-Saxon conception of a court had
been that of a dynamic agency clothed with the power to
supply the people with every necessary means for enjoying
the protection of the laws of the land. England chose to
confirm and sustain that power and in every one of the
procedural acts which were passed in the course of her long
struggle for reform, she expressly recognized and reserved
the authority in the judges to make general rules and orders,
even to the extent of changing the form of proceedings es-
tablished by Parliament.13 In the Judicature Act of 1873
11 3 & 4 William IV, c. 42.
12 15 & 16 Vict., e. 76.
,a For instance, the Common Law Procedure Acts of 185t (17 & 18 Viot.,
c. 125) and 1860 (23 & 24 Vice., c. 126).
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the theory of professional responsibility found its final rec-
ognition in a statute which frankly abandoned even the
form of a legislative mandate and substituted a schedule of
Rules of Court.
America, on the other hand, chose to repudiate the doc-
trine of professional control. No more striking contrast in
political theory could be conceived than is afforded by the
procedural acts of the last century in England and the almost
contemporary legislation in the United States beginning
with the Field Code in 1848. The New York legislature be-
lieved that the courts could be entirely regulated by the
clumsy and alien hand of the popular assembly, and yet
suffer no loss either in technical skill or in capacity to re-
spond to the public demand for service. It was a political
and economic blunder of the first magnitude, and set a pre-
cedent which changed the American judicial establishment
from a living stream into a stagnant pool. Deprived of all
initiative in devising new means and methods, and safely
concealed under the political shadow of the legislature, our
courts have become lifeless and bureaucratic, substituting
regularity for efficiency as an operating ideal.
Seventy-five years have passed since England and the
United States stood at the parting of the ways and made
their momentous decisions. Those years have been full of
progress in England; they have been years of inaction here.
Practically all the improvements in civil procedure which
have made England the envy of the world were invented or
adopted during that period by professional experts charged
with the high responsibility of enabling Englishmen to en-
joy prompt and adequate justice. The summons for direc-
tions was invented to enable the court to exercise an effec-
tive control over the progress of the case from its earliest
stage; the originating summons was devised as a means for
getting judicial decisions on specific questions without draw-
ing the entire subject-matter into litigation; discovery be-
fore trial has been tremendously expanded; summary and
declaratory judgments have been made more available; the
technical problems of joinder of parties and of causes of
action, and of the use of counterclaims, have practically
10
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disappeared, and in their place has come the simple question
of convenience; model forms of pleading have been adopted
to take the place of detailed rules; chamber practice in
equity has been revolutionized by the so-called 'linked-
judge" system whereby each case is assigned to a pair of
judges, one of whom is always in the court while the other
is in chambers; a commercial court has been organized and
operated to serve the needs of the large commercial interests
venue in every case is fixed by the court on the ground of
convenience; the powers of the court of appeal have been
enlarged and the procedure so simplified that no appeals
fail for procedural errors and practically no new trials are
ordered; a body of permanent masters, serving in effect as
assistant judges, has been organized to take over an import-
ant part of the work of the courts. Not a year has.gone by
in which some improvement in the rules has not been intro-
duced. They are under constant inspection, and whenever
weaknesses are discovered or changes in business or social
conditions make old methods of legal procedure inappro-
priate, new rules or amendments are provided to meet the
need. The court-rule system is a vital organ of the state,
functioning steadily, quietly and effectively through its in-
herent creative power. By its means the legal professioni
enjoys high credit for its skillful performance of an im-
portant public service.
Seventy-five years under a legislative system of procedure
has accustomed the legal profession in America to a dogged
perseverance in a hopeless cause. The conduct of the in-
tricate specialty for which they were trained was taken out
of their hands, and the political representatives of the
people prescribed the rules of practice upon which the
success or failure of the administration of justice largely
depended.
Instead of placing the code in the hands of the courts as
a mechanism to be used, improved, and developed by the
profession, as Parliament had always done with its proce-
dural statutes, the American legislature placed the seal of
finality upon its legislation and thereby destroyed its power
of growth. Under such conditions it is not surprising that
11
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we have been imitative rather than original, and our most
notable improvements in practice have been borrowed from
England.
IV
It might be supposed that the persistent use of legislation
throughout the United States in the regulation of the pro-
cedure of our ordinary courts, indicates that our legislative
bodies, at least, have not been impressed with the theoretical
weaknesses, political, economic and historical, which can be
so powerfully urged against-it.
A survey of contemporary political development, however,
will demonstrate exactly the contrary. Every new court
which Congress has created since the advent of the Field
Code has been given express power and authority to make
and amend its own rules for the regulation of practice and
procedure. This was true of the old Court of Claims, es-
tablished in 1855, and its authority to control its own pro-
cedure was continued when it was given full judicial powers
In 1863.14 The United States Court for China was estab-
lished with full rule-making power in 1906.1" The Court of
Customs Appeals was organized with similar authority in
1909.16 The Commerce Court, during its short career, exer-
cised the same power." Finally, in 1920, Congress enacted
a new code for the District of Columbia, and therein con-
ferred upon the Supreme Court of the District authority to
"establish written rules regulating pleading, practice and
procedure, and by said rules make such modifications in the
forms of pleading and methods of practice and procedure
prescribed by existing law as may be deemed necessary or
desirable to render more simple, effective, inexpensive and
expeditious the remedy in all suits and proceedings," pro-
vided that its equity rules shall not be inconsistent with the
equity rules issued by the Supreme Court of the United
States. 8
But the problems of legal procedure are not confined to
14 36 Stat. L. 1139.
15 34 Stat. L. 816, §5.
is Act of Aug. 3, 1909, §28.
1? 36 Stat. L. C. 231, §206.
19 Act of April 19, 1920.
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those tribunals which exercise powers which we term strict-
ly judicial. Modern political ingenuity has developed a vast
group of quasi-judicial bodies exercising powers which, for
constitutional reasons, are termed administrative, but which
deal with exactly the same kind of controversies and are
confronted with exactly the same procedural problems as
those tribunals which we call courts.
For forty years the Interstate Commerce Commission has
possessed and exercised the power to make general rules
and orders regulating its own procedure."9 The Board of
General Appraisers, the Board of Tax Appeals,2 the
Federal Trade Commission,22 and the Federal Power Com-
mission," all operate under full rule-making authority.
The states have followed exactly the same course as the
federal government. Every railroad or public utility com-
mission in the United States has been given general au-
thority to adopt rules of practice and procedure governing
hearings, investigations and proceedings before it. 24  And
the workmen's compensation laws, which in effect trans-
ferred to boards or commissions the jurisdiction over indus-
trial accidents formerly exercised by the courts, have in-
variably given to those commissions the power to make rules
for the regulation of their own practice and procedure.
When the courts, rather than commissions, are given power
to administer relief under the compensation laws, as in
Kansas,2 5 and Minnesota,28 those courts are themselves
clothed with power to make rules of procedure.
It thus appears that the almost universal American prac-
tice, in establishing new tribunals, whether udicial or
quasi-judicial, has been to place the full responsibility for
effective procedure upon those in charge of their operation.
This has not been due to the conviction that the procedure
of the new courts and commissions is more difficult than that
19 Act of 1887, §17.
20 36 Stat. at L. 0. 6, §12.
21 Revenue Act of June 2, 1924, §900.
22 Act of Sept. 26, 1914, §5.
23 Act of June 10, 1920, §4.
24 Report for 1923 of Committee on Uniformity of the National Associa-
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of the ordinary courts. On the contrary, the limited juris-
diction of most of them makes their technique more simple,
and yet the legislatures have uniformly declined to under-
take to do for them what they have so long done for the
regular courts. The reason seems not hard to find. Wish-
ing to make the new tribunals function strongly, the legis-
latures which created them were unwilling to tie their hands
by a rigid set of rules. They wanted results. They were un-
familiar with the conditions under which these new courts
and administrative bodies would operate, and understood
well enough that efficient methods are the joint product of
technical training and practical experience. Both qualifica-
tions could be found only among those who were to be active-
ly engaged in the administration of the new tribunals. There
were no ancient traditions to dull the judgment and banish
common sense. Therefore the development and operation of
the new judicial agencies were placed in the hands of ex-
perts.
V
But a court-rule system of judicial procedure is not self
executing. The chief business of appellate courts is the
hearing and decision of cases, and most of them are so over-
worked that they cannot be expected to devote much atten-
tion to the investigation of general problems connected with
the practice. They will pass upon proposals specifically
brought to their attention but they will not supply the in-
itiative necessary to make a court-rule system function
steadily and vigorously.
This has been the history of court rule regulation of prac-
tice by the Supreme Court of the United States. That
court was given power in 1792 to make rules of practice for
the federal courts in equity27 but it drifted along for thirty
years before drafting the first set of rules. 8 It then rested
for twenty years before making any further substantial
changes. 29 Thereafter nothing was done for seventy years
when the equity rules of 1913 were promulgated.
The same thing happened in Michigan, where the Supreme
27 1 U. S. St. at L. p. 276.
28 Equity Rules, 7 Wheat. XVII.
29 Rules published in 1 Howard.
14
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Court has possessed full rule-making power under the con-
stitution since 1850. The legislature, in 1851, added the
weight of its mandate in support of the constitutional grant
of power, by enacting that:
"The judges of the Supreme Court shall have the
power, and it shall be their duty, within three months
after this law shall take effect, by general rules to es-
tablish, and from time to time thereafter to modify
and amend, the practice in said court and in the circuit
courts, at law and in equity, . ..and they shall, once
at least in every two years thereafter, if necessary, re-
vise the said rules, with the view to the attainment, so
far as may be practicable, of the following improve-
ments in the practice: 1. The abolishing of distinc-
tions between law and equity proceedings, as far as
practicable. 2. .... ,1
The foregoing statute has remained continuously in force
since 1851. It has been practically a dead letter. No rules
at all were promulgated until 1858, and the injunction to
unify law and equity proceedings was absolutely ignored by
the adoption of separate sets of rules for legal and equitable
proceedings. The direction to revise every two years was
absolutely forgotten, and no revision was attempted for 38
years, when a particularly active committee of the state bar
association prepared a revised set of rules which were
promptly adopted by the court. Nothing further was done,
aside from a. few minute changes of a mechanical sort, for
20 years, when another bar association committee volun-
tarily took up the matter, prepared a revision which for the
first time undertook to obey the legislative command regard-
ing law and equity, and presented the revision to the judges
of the supreme court, who promptly adopted it. Finally,
in 1927, the legislature created a commission to study the
practice and to present proposals for improvement to the
supreme court, and this commission has made the first com-
prehensive investigation ever attempted and has prepared
the first thorough revision in the history of the state.
In Alabama the legislature gave the supreme court "full
plenary power ... to adopt such ... rules to regulate the
so Act 93, P. A. 1852.
15
Sunderland: The Regulation of Legal Procedure
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
practice and proceedings in all the courts of the state ...
as they may deem proper . .., provided that the Supreme
Court shall not . . . change . . . any act of the Legis-
lature."'" Fifteen years have gone by and the court has not
yet undertaken to use the power granted.
In Virginia, through the efforts of the State Bar Associa-
tion,32 the legislature passed an act providing that "the
Supreme Court of Appeals . . .shall prepare a system of
rules of practice to be used in all the courts of record of
this state, and put the same into effect.""3 Two years later,
the court having in the meanwhile done nothing, the pro-
vision was amended by changing "shall" to "may."'" Ten
more years have passed and Virginia seems to be still wait-
ing for a system of rules of procedure from its supreme
court.
This is not an encouraging catalogue of efforts to produce
an efficient control of procedure through rules of court. It
suggests a fundamental weakness somewhere in the system, a
weakness apparently due to lack of driving force or motive
power. To delegate authority to a competent professional
agency is useless if there is no means for compelling that
agency to function.
We are therefore led to the final step in the process,-a
mechanism by which the judicial rule-making authority
may have its attention constantly directed to the possibility
and need of improvement and through which tangible re-
sults may be obtained in the form of actually promulgated
rules.
VI
If we turn to the history of the court rule system in
England we shall find that the problem of keeping the rule-
makers informed and at work was encountered very soon
after the establishment of the system, and definite steps were
taken with a view to a practical solution. The judicature
Act of 1875, placed the power to make rules in the entire
a' Gen. Acts, 1913, No. 537.
82 19 VA. Lw REo. 321.
38 Acts of 1916 p. 930.
84 2 Code 1919, §5960.
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high court,"5 but it quickly became apparent that this would
not work, and the next year the authority was transferred to
a Rule Committee of six judges." Five years later the rule
committee was increased to eight members, including the
Lord Chancellor and four judges appointed by him. In
1909, by the Rule Committee Act," the committee was re-
organized to consist of two barristers appointed by the
General Council of the Bar, two solicitors (one of them ap-
pointed by the Incorporated Law Society and the other by
the Lord Chancellor), and seven judges in addition to the
Lord Chancellor, three of them designated by the act and
four appointed by the Lord Chancellor.
By the creation of the Rule Committee, responsibility,
previously scattered was localized. Through the addition of
active members of the practicing bar, a broader outlook was
obtained, and better contacts were established with the com-
mercial community and with the public generally. These
measures obviously promote efficiency, and have been
adopted in other parts of the British Empire.
The English example has also impressed Americans in-
terested in regulation of procedure by rules of court. In
1913 the Colorado legislature passed an act providing that
"the Supreme Court shall prescribe rules of practice and
procedure in all courts of record and may change or rescind
the same.' 8  This legislation was initiated and secured by
the state bar association, 9 but it very soon become apparent
that the court itself would not supply the motive force
necessary for the successful regulation of the practice by
rules. Accordingly, in 1916, the state bar association,
through a special committee, requested the supreme court to
itself appoint a Standing Rules committee consisting of
several judges of that court, several district and county
court judges, and several practicing lawyers, whose duty it
slould be to consider and recommend to the supreme court
such rules and amendments as they might deem proper."
85 §17.
8s Appellate Jurisdiction Act, §17.
87 Judicature Act, 1894, §4.
s Session Laws, 1913, ch. 121.
so Am. Bar Assn. Rep. (1915) p. 853.
40 Colo. Bar Assn. Rep. (1916) p. 220.
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This recommendation was based directly upon English ex-
perience with the rules committee. For a long time nothing
was done by the supreme court toward the creation of such
a committee, although the state bar association persisted in
its efforts and repeatedly urged its appointment. The pro-
posed personnel was subsequently altered by dropping the
members of the supreme court, and suggesting a committee of
seven, consisting of two district court judges, one county court
judge and four practicing lawyers.4' Finally after ten years
of effort, such a committee was appointed,42 and, according
to the last report of the Colorado Bar Association, is func-
tioning with some success. 3 It is doubtful, however, whether
a committee appointed by the court itself will contribute
much force and initiative to the regulation of the practice.
It will tend to move no faster than the court desires, and
since it is the mere creature of the court it will be subject
to all the inhibitions which operate upon court action.
A similar demand for centralized initiative and more
adequate public contacts was made in New Jersey. In that
state the common law system was completely swept away in
1912, and was replaced by a skeleton act providing for a
comprehensive, court rule system under the direction of the
supreme court.4 But the weakness incident to the lack of
driving power was quickly apparent, and in 1915 the State
Bar Association, which had secured the passage of the act
of 1912, was proposing the legislative creation of a "Council
for Judicial Procedure," consisting of four judges, the at-
torney general and three practicing lawyers, who should
supervise the operation of the rules of practice and report
to the governor and legislature at regular intervals what
changes, if any, it deemed advisable.45 The next year the
Bar Association committee was able to report that it had
secured the passage of a bill creating such a council." What
has been accomplished by this measure does not appear from
the proceedings of the New Jersey Bar Association.
41 Colo. Bar Assn. Rep. (1924) p. 340, (1925) p. 210.
42 Id. (1926) p. 175.
43 Colo. Bar Assn. Rep. (1928) p. 181.
44 Laws 1912, ch. 231.
'5 Year Book, N. J. Bar Assn., 1914-15, p. 169.
d6 Id., 1915-16, p. 171.
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The greatest general obstacle to efficiency in the adminis-
tration of justice is the lack of any public opinion on the
subject. Public opinion is the indispensable dynamic ele-
ment in popular government, and its vigorous development
Is the only guaranty of a successful state. Delegation of
legislative power over rules of procedure to the courts will
tend, in the absence of a corrective, to submerge the subject
below the surface of public consciousness, for the reason
that we have taken the courts out of the field of political
criticism. In a government based on laws the judicial action
of the courts must command instant respect and obedience.
Their unreversed and unrepealed decisions must be accepted
as the final embodiment of the law of the land. To preserve
this respect for the law we have removed the courts them-
selves from the arena of political discussion and debate, and
have granted them the "prerogative of inerrancy or infalli-
bility."
Accordingly, the rule-making power in the hands of the
judges would be under a double disability in respect to
public opinion, for the natural difficulty of interesting
people in so technical a subject would be added to the tradi-
tion of deference for the judiciary which protects it from
attack. It is useless to expect an efficient and vigorous ad-
ministration in the absence of the only stimulus which has
the power to quicken public service.
Rule-making is not a strictly judicial function, but is
rather legislative and administrative, and to lay this duty
exclusively upon the courts is inconsistent with the position
to which we have assigned them in our scheme of govern-
ment. It is wrong in principle to require the judges to carry
the burden of these non-judicial activities, for they either lay
themselves open to criticism in that field which may react
unfavorably upon their judicial prestige and position, or
the public is denied the right to freely criticize those who
are really performing political functions. The vital dif-
ference between the judiciary and the other departments of
government is that the latter should be responsive to popular
opinion while the judiciary should be independent of it.'
A true public opinion in regard to the administration of
47 Wioom: PWAcE xo ScIENCE OF LEGAL METoD, p. xlii.
19
Sunderland: The Regulation of Legal Procedure
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
justice can be developed only by making that subject a
familiar topic of political discussion, and this can be done
successfully only by placing the immediate responsibility
for such administration in political and non-judicial hands.
This point has been stressed in England against the Lord
Chancellor as administrative head of the department of
justice. In the course of a series of thoughtful articles in
the Solicitors' Journal, in 1921, the writer, after pointing
out the important judicial position of the Lord Chancellor,
says: "While his essential functions thus defined are in this
way raised, and rightly raised, above public criticism, other
functions which he exercises and which do not deserve this
sanctuary are automatically raised with them, and in this
way the services of the Judicature, because they are centered
in the Lord Chancellor, become screened from public criti-
cism, and, in the larger sense, are still waters. The pretense
is made that public interference with questions of establish-
ment in the ordering of the Judicature is an interference
with the powers and duties of the judges. * * * The Lord
Chancellor is unable to abate the reserve imposed upon him
as representative of the Sovereign and the Judiciary; * * *
and yet, if the services of the Judicature are to meet public
expectations, it is required of him that he should hold him-
self liable to attack when they fall below the standard set.
The immunity from attack which he now enjoys is at the
root of the inadequacy of the services. 8
Responsibility for improving the administration of justice
must not be hidden under the judicial ermine, and yet it
must be placed in expert hands. It follows that a commis-
sion or council made up largely of members of the legal pro-
fession, having an official status, and representing the public
and the profession as a political agency, holds out the
greatest promise for an efficient and adequate regulation of
legal procedure. The movement for "judicial councils,"
which is making rapid progress in the United States, sug-
gests a convenient and effective means for the exercise of the
rule-making power. The Massachusetts Judicial Council
has been the most conspicuous and successful organization
of the kind which has yet been established. Its function
48 66 SOuCITOES' JouR. (Nov., 1921) 70.
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has been chiefly to recommend legislation, not rules, but it
is very obvious that if the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts had full rule-making power, the value of the re-
markable services of this Judicial Council would be im-
measurably increased. The superior court of Connecticut
for many years has had the power to make rules necessary
to carry into effect a brief practice act,49 and a judicial
council has recently been established in that state to aid the
court by initiating inquiries as to the causes for the com-
plaints against the administration of justice, and by pro-
posing remedies.5 0 The council has authority to require re-
ports from the officers of the various courts relating to judi-
cial proceedings, by means of which it will be able to obtain
reliable information as to what is really being done. Data of
this kind is an indispensable prerequisite to the formulation
of adequate measures for relief, and it is well understood
that the almost universal lack of judicial statistics in the
United States has been one of the greatest obstacles to ef-
fective improvement.
So, in Virginia, a judicial council, consisting both of
lawyers and judges, has just been created, the judicial mem-
bers not belonging to the court which has the rule-making
power.1' In Michigan a bill is now in the legislature to
create a judicial council composed largely of practicing
lawyers, as a means for making effective the rule-making
power conferred by the constitution.
The state of Washington conferred full rule-making power
on its supreme court in 1926,2 and at the same time created
a judicial council, consisting of four judges, two members of
the legislature and three members of the bar, to make the
grant of power effective."
The judicial council seems to be the American solution for
the problem of regulating procedure by rules of court. By
its means the courts, which promulgate the rules, will re-
ceive the assistance which they need in studying the situa-
49 Gen. Stat., 1918, §5475.
50 P. A. 1927, ch. 190.
i Va. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1928) §657 (a-e).
62 L. 1925, ch. 118.
s Id. oh. 45.
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tion and in formulating remedies, and the legal profession,
which has a greater stake in the efficient administration of
justice than any other element of society, will be enabled to
contribute its knowledge and skill to the task of improving
legal procedure.
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